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RECENT DECISIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - DUE PROCESS - POWER OF MICIDGAN ONE-MAN
JURY TO PUNISH CONTEMPT- Petitioners were two witnesses called
before a Detroit Recorder's Court judge sitting as a Michigan one-man
grand jury to investigate suspected police corruption. During the hearings
both petitioners were cited for contempt. An order to show cause why they
should not be punished was issued by the judge. Subsequently, in open
hearings, the same judge convicted and sentenced petitioners. The Michigan Supreme Court affirmed.1 On certiorari to the United States Supreme
Court, held, reversed. To allow a judge who sat as a one-man grand jury to
preside at a contempt hearing regarding the same witnesses violates due
process. In re Murchison, (U.S. 1955) 75 S.Ct. 623.
Michigan's popularly-termed one-man grand jury is not a grand jury in
the common law sense.2 The principal differences between it and the com• mon law grand jury are (1) the inv:estigation is performed by one judge
instead of sixteen to twenty-three grand jurors; (2) the judge issues no
indictment but offers a "presentment" of findings. The system has been
particularly effective in dealing with corruption among public officials, 8
and past attacks upon it as an unconstitutional delegation of executive
functions to the judiciary have been unsuccessful. 4 The principal weapon of
the judge-investigator has been the power to punish recalcitrant witnesses for
contempt.5 Traditionally, there are two types of criminal contempt. The
first, direct contempt, permits summary punishment. This punishment is
consistent with due process only if the misconduct occurs in open court, is
observed by the judge, and disrupts pending proceedings.6 Summary punishment is said to be essential to preserve authority and prevent the obstrucGRAND

1 Two separate cases were combined in the appeal to the Supreme Court. In re White,
340 Mich. 140, 65 N.W. (2d) 296 (1954); In re Murchison, 340 Mich. 151, 65 N.W. (2d)
301 (1954).
2By Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §§767.3 to 767.6b, Michigan judges of courts of record
have wide power to investigate suspected crime in their jurisdictions, including the power
to subpoena and punish witnesses for contempt.
3 Winters, "The Michigan One-Man Grand Jury," 28 J. AM. Jun. Soc. 137 (1945). Critical of its methods is Gallagher, "The One-Man Grand Jury-A Reply," 29 J. AM. Jun.
Soc. 21 (1945).
4In re Slattery, 310 Mich. 458, 17 N.W. (2d) 251 (1945); Mundy v. McDonald, 216
Mich. 444, 185 N.W. 877 (1921); People v. Doe, 226 Mich. 5, 196 N.W. 757 (1924); People
v. Wolfson, 264'Mich. 409,250 N.W. 260 (1933).
5 The principal case arose because of the Michigan Supreme Court's view that the
judge-grand juror functions with the full complement of judicial powers. Mich. Comp.
Laws (1948; Supp. 1952) §767.4, directed at preventing a judge-grand juror from hearing
a contempt charge arising from his investigation, was declared unconstitutional in In
re White, note I supra, on the ground that the law was a legislative interference with
inherent judicial power.
6 In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 68 S.Ct., 499 (1948); Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 9 S.Ct.
77 (1888). See also R.APALJE, CONTEMPT (1890); 39 J: CRIM. L. 359 (1948); 26 N. D. B.
BRIEFS 402 (1950).

1956]

RECENT DECISIONS

415

tion of justice.7 The second type, constructive contempt, occurs other than
in the court's personal presence.8 Here, due process requires that the contemnor be given notice, right to counsel and a full hearing. 9 In both types,
the contemned judge sits in judgment. Because of possible abuse of this
power, restrictions have been placed on its exercise. A judge who cites for
contempt will be restricted from punishing the contempt if he has become
personally embroiled with the contemnor to the extent that he may hold a
personal bias.10 In the principal case, however, the Court precludes the
judge from presiding at the contempt hearing without any such finding,
but simply because he has an "interest" in the outcome. However, all contemned judges can be said to have an "interest" in seeing a contemnor
punished for obstructing justice.11 Therefore, the decision cannot be explained on the ground that this use of the contempt power is more unfair
than is its use in traditional contempt cases. The explanation lies in the
fact that the attempted use in Michigan extends beyond the normal contempt procedure. In In re Oliver, it w.as held that contempt of a Michigan
judge-grand jury is not the type of contempt which justifies summary punishment.12 Thereafter, Michigan was forced to deal with contempts of the
judge-grand jury as cases of constructive contempt. This placed a judge
with personal knowledge of prejudicial facts on a bench historically reserved, in constructive contempt hearings, for a judge who did not witness
the contempt. Since the judge's personal knowledge is an essential element
only in direct contempt cases, no valid argument can be made that the
judge-grand juror must preside at the hearing.13 In the principal case, the
Supreme Court goes further by saying that, under the due process clause, this
judge cannot preside over the contempt hearing. The Court will not allow
the power to punish for constructive contempt to be ex.tended as a personal
club of a judge-investigator, although the judge of a court to which a lay
grand jury is attached can punish a contemptuous grand jury witness.14 The
reason for the refusal to ex.tend this power seems to be based on the view,
implicit in the Oliver opinion, that the person contemned was not at the
7Fisher v. Pace, 336 U.S. 155, 69 S.Ct. 425 (1949).

s Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 62 S.Ct., 190 (1941) (newspaper publication);
Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 45 S.Ct. 390 (1925) (letter sent to judge in chambers).
Ex parte Savin, 131 U.S. 267, 9 S.Ct. 699 (1889). See 48 CoL. L. R.Ev. 813 (1948).
also the dissents in
Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 72 S.Ct. 451 (1952); Craig v. Hecht, 263 U.S. 255,
44 S.Ct. 103 (1923); Fisher v. Pace,· note 7 supra.
11 This is pointed out by the dissent in the principal case at 627.
12 333 U.S. 257 at 276, 68 S.Ct. 499 (1948). An open trial with notice and counsel
was said to be required because misconduct occurring in grand jury secrecy could not
result in demoralization of the court's authority before the public, and hence did not
justify summary action.
13 Possession by the judge of knowledge not appearing on the record and not subject
to cross-examination is said to result in a fatal "influence" on the judge. Principal case
at 626.
14 See Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 60 S.Ct. 540 (1940).
9

10 Cf. Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 75 S.Ct. 11 (1954). See
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time a "judge," but rather an investigator.15 The principal case simply
follows this idea, and refuses to allow this accuser to sit on his own case.16

Stephen C. Bransdorfer, S.Ed.

15 "In the midst of petitioner's testimony the proceedings abruptly changed. The
investigation became a 'trial,' the grand jury became a judge•••." In re Oliver, note 6
supra, at 272.
16 No other case involving this same "accusatorial" interest in a judge was cited as
precedent by petitioners or found by the writer. But to the effect that a judge's financial
interest in securing conviction violates due process, see Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510,
47 S.Ct. 437 (1927).

